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This paper examines the direct and indirect effects of decentralization on economic growth 
that take place through transmission channels such as government efficiency, control of 
corruption, public sector size and the quality of living. A dynamic nature of growth, potential 
endogeneity and the distinction between short and long run effects are taken into account. Our 
findings support proactive government approach, including fiscal policy measures to 
stimulate demand, prevent decline of production and employment and rebuild trust in 
institutions. They question the current prevalent thinking about the beneficial effects of the 
reduction of public expenditure on economic growth.  
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Past decades have witnessed the transfer of accountability and responsibility for the 
provision and financing of public goods and services from central to lower government levels. 
The motives for fiscal decentralization range from the creation of an efficient entrepreneurial-
like system for the provision of public services in developed countries over the urge to resist 
political pressures on public expenditure in the developing world to the transition from 
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centrally planned to market economy in Central and Eastern Europe. It is now widely held 
that closer contact of local units with a population paves the way for better understanding of 
public needs, costs of public service provision and more efficient resource allocation. 
Furthermore, fiscal decentralization enhances participation of citizens in local administration 
and planning of future development. Together, these factors lead to higher accountability of 
local public servants, lower corruption and higher living standards and growth.  
The aforementioned benefits of decentralization have spurred academic interest in this 
topic. There is now substantial evidence on the direct impact of former on the economic 
growth. However, the process of decentralization and its relationship with economic growth is 
far too complex to be encompassed with direct effects of former on the latter. This is mainly 
due to the fact that decentralization manifests itself through a number of dimensions and 
influences processes recognized as determinants of growth such as institutional quality, 
government size or the quality of human capital. Neither indirect transmission channels of 
decentralization on economic growth nor its multidimensional nature have received 
substantial attention in the existing literature. Furthermore, existing work on decentralization 
does not take into consideration factors such as the dynamic nature of growth, reverse 
causality between growth and decentralization or the potential endogeneity of the latter.  
 
Bearing the above said in mind, this paper investigates effects of fiscal decentralization on 
economic growth in 24 developed and developing economies over 2005-2012 period. In 
modelling, both direct and indirect effects of fiscal decentralization on economic growth are 
included. The potential endogeneity of decentralization and correlation of growth with its past 
realizations is taken into account. The analysis distinguishes between short and long run 
effects of decentralization on growth introducing the dynamic panel methodology to the 
research on the relationship between fiscal decentralization and growth. Modelling of 
decentralization acknowledges multidimensional nature of this process unlike prevalent 
approach in the literature that focuses solely on individual dimensions of decentralization. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section two puts forward the theoretical framework of the 
relationship between fiscal decentralization, economic growth and development and an 
overview of empirical literature. Third section presents model of investigation. Dataset and 
methodology are explained in section four. Empirical results are dealt with in section five. 
Finally, section six concludes. 
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2. FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION, ECONOMIC GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT 
 
Over past decades economic theory has yielded arguments both in favour and against 
fiscal decentralization. For proponents, the greater palette of local public services and tax 
packages together with better insight over local economic, social and fiscal conditions can 
better meet heterogeneous preferences and needs of citizens and business entities (Tiebout, 
1956; Brennan and Buchanan, 1980; Faguet, 2004; Barankay and Lockwood, 2007). 
Arguments against decentralization are centred around uneven quality in provision of public 
services and widening of regional development gaps due to lower skills of local 
administrative employees and the inability to exploit economies of scale in tax collection and 
in provision of public services. According to the decentralization theorem (Oates, 1972), 
through decentralization the economy can achieve a competitive market-like outcome in a 
provision of public goods and services, improve allocative efficiency of public sector and 
increased growth and welfare.  
According to leviathan hypothesis (Brennan and Buchanan, 1980), fiscal decentralization 
constrains efforts of central government to extract resources of its citizens. The mobility of 
population and business entities penalizes inefficient governance and can lead to fiscal 
competition between local governments which constrains excessive taxation and public sector 
size while increasing efficiency in provision of public goods and services (Thiessen, 2003). 
Evidence from vast amount of literature appears to support theoretical predictions about 
negative relationship between fiscal decentralization and the size of public sector (Grossman, 
1989, Joulfaian and Marlow, 1990 and 1991, Jin and Zou 2002, Rodden, 2003, Prohl and 
Schneider, 2009). It appears that the motivation of local units to increase own revenues in 
combination with budget constraints act as an incentive for efficient allocation of funds and 
greater efforts in their collection.  
Positive effects of decentralization lead to increased efficiency of the entire public sector 
and promote cooperation between different fiscal levels. Through decentralization the burden 
of central government activities is being passed on lower administrative levels. At the same 
time, local units are given the opportunity to implement innovations and experiment with new 
developmental and fiscal policies and programs which, if proven successful, can be applied at 
the central level. Local initiative can lead to more innovative and efficient approach to 
provision of public services and more efficient use of public assets. However, the realization 
of the above effects depends on flexibility, innovativeness and creativity in governance.  
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The satisfaction of final beneficiaries of public goods is revealed through elections. This 
acts as an incentive for increased transparency and accountability, as well as investment of 
efforts in the knowledge about public preferences (Hunther and Shah, 1998; Fisman and 
Gatti, 2002; Arikan 2004; Lederman et al. 2005; Freille et al., 2007; Lessmann and 
Markwardt, 2010; Fiorino et al., 2012). It could be concluded that fiscal decentralization has a 
beneficial effect on political participation of citizens at the local level. Furthermore, greater 
participation of citizens in decision making about local development questions implies 
increased transparency and accountability of public governments and thus better corruption 
control. These effects are particularly emphasized in countries characterized by greater 
geographical surface, regional economic heterogeneity and ethnical, racial, cultural and 
linguistic diversity.  
Negative sides of delegation of responsibilities over local development to lower levels 
have been identified in the literature as well. The failure to accompany the transfer of 
responsibility for provision of certain public services with adequate transfer of funds can 
erode the quality of provided services such as education or primary health care which has 
negative implications on productivity and long run growth. Those negative effects can be 
offset through predefinition of minimal standards in the provision of public services, adequate 
transfer of funds to local units as well as ex post control over quality and level of the 
provision of public services. Another common feature of decentralization is increased 
employment in public administration. In smaller local units employees often lack adequate 
education and attainment for exploitation of advantages of a decentralized system. Large costs 
of local tax collection can also reduce revenues of local units. Potential for corruption can 
exist due to lack of responsibility and influence of local elites (Prud'homme, 1995; Thiessen, 
2003; Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2000 and 2005).  
 
Another argument against fiscal decentralization suggests that it inhibits economic growth 
through vertical imbalances, regional inequalities and difficulties in coordination of 
macroeconomic policy (Tanzi, 1996). The distributional inequalities can arise from the gap 
between available revenues and the required costs of local units. Prud'homme (1995) suggests 
that increased fiscal competition between local units due to decentralization increases 
attractiveness of wealthier local units characterized by better quality of human capital, access 
to markets and more developed infrastructure for mobile factors of production. The ability of 
these units to provide better public goods and services arises from a wider tax basis. 
Moreover, these units have the ability to provide public services of comparable quality to 
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those provided by poorer units but with a lower tax burden. The general message is that 
mobile households and business entities will prefer wealthier local units and thus increase 
their tax base and widen regional fiscal gap.  
Main potential macroeconomic risks associated with decentralization encompass 
increased fiscal pressure and lower fiscal discipline. Numerous authors suggest that fiscal 
decentralization increases local public expenditure, deficit and public debt, thus reducing the 
effectiveness of stabilization policies (Prud’homme, 1995; Tanzi, 1996; Fornasari et al., 2000; 
Dabla-Norris and Wade, 2002). The key to successful decentralization therefore lies in the 
development of multilevel public finance system that enables effective and efficient provision 
of public services while maintaining macroeconomic stability. However, the imposition of 
budget limitations at the local and regional level is often constrained by politics.  
Modelling approach to decentralization and growth prevalently takes place through direct 
relationship between the two (Iimi, 2005; Blochliger et al., 2013). Findings from this 
literature range from positive (Desai et al., 2003) over negative (Davoodi and Zou, 1998; 
Woller and Phillips, 1998; Martinez – Vazquez and McNab, 2006; Thornton, 2007; 
Rodriguez – Pose and Ezcura, 2010; Baskaran and Feld, 2012) to the hump – shaped 
relationship (Thiessen, 2003; Bodman and Ford, 2006). Reported findings reveal sensitivity to 
the variables reflecting the intergovernmental fiscal framework, the period of analysis, 
geographical area under consideration and the choice of an empirical approach. Gemmell et 
al. (2013) note that revenue and expenditure dimensions of decentralization have opposing 
effects on economic growth and that the overall effects of decentralization are visible in the 
long run. Moreover, it is suggested that the causality of the relationship between 
decentralisation and growth may however run in the reverse direction with development being 
the root rather than the consequence of decentralisation (Oates 1972; Tanzi, 1996). 
Previously mentioned arguments for the introduction of decentralization such as improved 
efficiency of public sector, better quality of the provision of public services and a higher 
standard of living have to impact on the economic growth. From there it follows that the 
impact of decentralization on economic growth also takes place through indirect transmission 
channels. According to New Institutional Economics (North, 1994; Williamson, 1996; 
Edison, 2003; Rodrik, 2004) the way in which institutions are managed in order to create a 
stable, transparent and predictable business environment facilitates growth. Poor public 
administration paves the way for risk and uncertainty, weak protection of ownership rights all 
of which have adverse effect on the efficiency of the allocation of resources and on the 
economic growth (Sala-and–Martin, 2002). According to Acemoglu et al. (2003) poor 
 6 
macroeconomic performance can be associated with weak institutions such as low protection 
of investors, widespread corruption and absence of control over political elites. Similar 
findings have been reported for transition countries, those with low levels of revenues and 
closed economies (Sachs and Warner, 1995).  
The general finding from empirical literature is that corruption has adverse effect on 
economic growth through the reduction of domestic and foreign direct investment, obstacles 
for doing business and entrepreneurship, negative impact on international trade and price 
stability and suboptimal allocation of public expenditure (Brunetti et al., 1999; Li et al., 2000; 
Gyimah-Brempong, 2002; Mendez and Sepulveda, 2006; Campos et al., 2010; Ugur and 
Dasgupta, 2011). Additionally, it leads to an increase in prices of goods and services 
purchased by state and diversifies the structure of public expenditure towards areas where 
bribes are easier to collect. The work of some authors suggests, however, that corruption can 
have a beneficial impact on economic performance (Egger and Winner, 2005; Aidt, 2009) as 
corruptive practices enable faster resolution of problems in economies characterized by a 
complex bureaucracy and poor legislative framework.  
Public governance and economic growth are in a mutually reinforcing relationship. Better 
quality of institution comes at financial costs and thus can only be afforded by wealthier 
countries (Svensson, 2005). Moreover, the desire of elites to maintain political power and 
earn support of voters reduces inclination towards corruption (Aidt and Dutta, 2008). 
Furthermore, corruption is often related with shorter life expectancy, lower levels of 
education and trade openness, all of which are determinants of economic growth, thus 
suggesting a potential endogeneity problem (Peyton and Belasen, 2010).  
According to one line of thinking, large public expenditure can jeopardize economic 
growth through an increase in costs of financing and through the creation of differences in 
productivity growth between public and private sector (Davoodi and Zou, 1998). Most studies 
report negative relationship between the size of public sector and growth (Dar and 
AmirKhalkali, 2002; Romero – Avila and Strauch, 2008, Afonso and Furceri, 2010; Bergh 
and Karlsson, 2010) although the work of Agell et al. (2006) and Colombier (2009) suggests 
that the relationship between the two is positive. Impact of government (expenditure) size on 
economic growth is closely related to the quality of institutional framework, which leads to 
potential endogeneity of the former (Afonso and Furceri, 2010). Increased public expenditure 
can be associated with distortions in taxation and regulatory activities, less efficient provision 
of services and potential corruption. The nature of automatic stabilizers acts as an additional 
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source of endogeneity. The economic downturn increases this kind of expenditures, while 
adverse effects take place during expansion.  
Endogenous growth models emphasize the importance of human capital for economic 
growth (Lucas, 1988; Romer, 1990; Barro, 1990). Education determines the productivity of 
labor, innovativeness and technological progress (Krueger and Lindahl, 2001; Hanushek and 
Wossmann, 2007). The quality of human capital indirectly influences economic growth 
through income redistribution. Higher education of population reduces poverty and 
unproductive government transfers. More educated population is often characterized by 
smaller families (a smaller number of children) and increased own willingness to invest in 
education of future generations, thus reducing various types of family expenditures. 
Furthermore, educated citizens have better opportunities of self – employment which helps to 
reduce unemployment transfers. Higher levels of human development are more easily 
achieved in economically developed countries. UNDP (2013) notes that countries with very 
high values of human development index (HDI) have been about 20 times higher GDP per 
capita than countries with low HDI.  
Previously mentioned studies reveal several stylised facts about the relationship between 
fiscal decentralization and economic growth. It is evident that decentralization influences 
growth both directly and indirectly. Indirect impact was neglected in the analysed literature. 
Additionally, the analysis of its effects depends on the observed dimension of 
decentralization. While pieces of evidence on the expenditure side of decentralization are 
mostly negative, the opposite finding holds in the case of revenue decentralization. An 
important drawback of the existing body of knowledge is its reliance on static econometric 
techniques. In the work of the majority of authors, panel dimension of data is ignored, which 
leads to a loss of efficiency in estimation. Moreover, the existing studies largely neglect the 
possibility of reverse causality between decentralization and growth as well as potential 
endogeneity of the former, which questions the validity of the reported results. Finally, the 
existing studies do not take into consideration the dynamic nature of growth. Present study 
aims to fill some of these gaps.  
 
3. MODEL OF INVESTIGATION 
 
Building on theoretical and empirical foundations of the previous section, a model is 
developed that takes into account direct impact of fiscal decentralization on economic growth, 
as well as its indirect effects through the relationship with development goals. With respect to 
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the latter it is assumed that decentralization provides better insight into needs and preferences 
of inhabitants and business entities, motivates more efficient governance of public sector and 
leads to active role of local population. In a parallel development, the need for more 
transparent behaviour of local government and its accountability arises. Together, these 
processes manifest themselves in improved perception about efficiency of public governance 
and corruption control, reduced public expenditure and higher living standard. The final 
outcome of all these processes is higher economic growth (Figure 1). It is expected that 
realization of these processes does not happen instantaneously. Rather they develop over time 
for which reason the full effects of decentralization will be visible only in the long run.  
The analytical development of the model presented in Figure (1) takes place through 
several regressions. The modeling of direct effects of decentralization in general form can be 
expressed as:  
Growthit = f(Growthit-1, FDit, CONTROLit)                                                 (1)  
In the above equation, the dependent variable is defined as annual growth of GDP per 
capita taken from World Development Indicators database. Direct channels of 
decentralization in equation (1) (FDit) encompass both revenue and expenditure dimensions. 
Two indicators of revenue decentralization include the share of revenues of the local unit in 
total revenues of state (FDREV) and the share of revenues of the local unit in GDP 
(REVGDP). On the expenditure side, decentralization is measured by the share of local units’ 
expenditure in total government expenditure (FDEXP) and in GDP (EXPGDP). Finally, the 
model includes variable labelled vertical fiscal imbalance (VFI), the share of national 
government’s transfers to local units in total government expenditure. The data for 
construction of these indicators is obtained from OECD’s Fiscal Decentralization database. A 
positive sign is expected for all of these variables. 
A starting point in the modelling of indirect decentralization effects on the economic 
growth is Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) analysis of over 90 countries in the 1965 – 1985 
periods. According to their findings, economic growth is positively correlated with the 
investment intensity, level of education and life expectancy. For this reason, indirect effects in 
equation (2) include developmental variables (DV): NI-HDI, SIZEEXP, GE, CORUP. Non – 
income human development index (NI – HDI), is a version of previously defined HDI index 
without income component. The data for this variable were derived from United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) database. Furthermore, the above-mentioned study 
suggests that the size of the public sector is negatively correlated with GDP growth. 
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Using data from OECD Fiscal Decentralization database a variable SIZEEXP is 
defined as the ratio between the total government expenditure and GDP. Finally, the model 
also includes two variables that measure the quality of institutions, namely government 
efficiency (GE) and corruption control (CORUP). These variables were built on the basis of 
data from World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators database. 
 
Model for analysis of indirect effects of fiscal decentralization on economic growth 
takes the form of: 
                     DVit = f(DVit-1, FDit, CONTROLit)                                                 (2a)  
                     Growthit = f(Growthit-1, DVit, CONTROLit)                                   (2b)  
 
The dependent variables in equation (2a) are previously defined measures of national 
development objectives while fiscal decentralization is measured with previously defined 
indicators. From there, the residuals are obtained and inserted in equation (2b) that relates 
improvements in domestic development objectives with economic growth. This way, the 
indirect effects of decentralization are modelled through their impact on national development 
objectives. However, such modelling approach also suggests that any analysis of the 
relationship between decentralization and growth must take into account potential 
endogeneity of the former. These issues have largely been neglected by previous literature, 
but it will be dealt with within the present study. 
 
The model also includes a number of control variables recognized as determinants of 
economic growth in the existing literature. Bearing in mind the sample size and data 
availability, index of technological development (TAI), share of investment in GDP 
(INVEST), unemployment rate (UNEM), trade openness (OPEN) and country area size 
(AREA) are included. Economists have for a long time recognised the importance of 
knowledge and technology for the economic growth (Solow, 1956; Romer, 1986; 1990; 
Aghion and Howitt, 1998). Following Desai et al. (2003) and using data from World Bank’s 
WDI database, an index has been calculated that takes into account creation and acceptance of 
new technologies and usage of old basic technologies. A positive sign is expected for this 
variable.  
 10 






Better match between provided 
public services and needs and 
preferences of population 
Increased efficiency  
of public sector 
Increased transparency and 
accountability of government 
Active role of citizens in 
planning of local development 
Increased government efficiency  
 
Better control of corruption  
 
Reduction of public expenditure  
 






Traditional economic theory postulates that due to diminishing returns investment 
does not influence the long-run rate of growth (Mankiw et al., 1992; King and Levine, 1993; 
Sala – i – Martin, 1996). However, findings of numerous empirical studies suggest that there 
is a positive relationship between rates of investment and growth (Barro, 1991; Levine and 
Renert, 1992; Barro, 1996; Caselli et al., 1996; Barro and Sala – i – Martin, 1995; Barro et al., 
1997). Using data from International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) World Economic Outlook 
Database, a variable defined as the share of total investment in GDP is included. A positive 
sign is expected on this variable.  
The inclusion of control variable for the unemployment is motivated with the fact that 
persistent unemployment has negative impact on the economic growth. On the one hand, long 
– term unemployment erodes skills and knowledge of workers thus reducing their 
attractiveness to labor market. High levels of unemployment also reduce aggregate demand 
through lower consumption and investment in physical and human capital. Moreover, 
unemployment is negatively correlated with satisfaction with government and public 
administration and living standard while it increases public expenditure through demand for 
additional social transfers. The variable UNEMP is defined as the ratio between unemployed 
persons and total labor force and it is constructed using data from World Bank WDI database. 
A negative sign is expected for this variable.  
Jamison et al. (2003) note that trade openness strongly influences economic growth. 
Greater openness can be associated with output fluctuations, while free movement of capital 
increases tax competition and thus has a negative effect on government size (Coricelli, 2005). 
Openness is associated with knowledge transfer and foreign direct investment. For this 
reason, trade openness, defined as the ratio between the sum of exports and imports and GDP, 
is expected to have a positive impact on economic growth. Finally, the model includes a 
variable defined as size of the country in km2. As noted in the previous section, larger states 
can be associated with complex administration for which reason a negative effect on growth 
can be expected (Kurtz and Schrank, 2007). However, traditional economic theory also 
postulates that the size of a country is an important driver of economic growth. To this end, 
there are no a priori expectations about the sign of this variable. 
4. METHODOLOGY AND DATASET 
Estimation of the previously described models is undertaken with the use of system 
dynamic panel GMM estimator. Longitudinal nature of the database suggests that suitable 
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estimator should be selected from the group of panel estimators. Furthermore, current rates of 
economic growth can be related to their past realizations. Finally, several studies mentioned 
earlier point to the existence of mutually reinforcing relationship between variables 
representing development objectives and indicators of fiscal decentralization. The implication 
of the above is that measures of decentralization are likely to be correlated with some of the 
unobserved factors. Finally, it needs to be emphasized that the impact of decentralization 
becomes completely realized only in the long run. For this reason, analysis should take into 
consideration the distinction between the short and the long run.  
The method capable of addressing all of the above-mentioned issues is dynamic panel 
estimator (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998) 
which is a part of the family of Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) estimators. In the 
presence of endogeneity, dynamic panel estimator can yield unbiased and consistent estimates 
using instruments found within the system. Among available dynamic panel estimators the 
system two-step estimation procedure is chosen. This way, the potential bias due to lagged 
levels of series being close to a random walk is avoided and inclusion of time-invariant 
variables is enabled. Moreover, by using a two step estimator estimation procedure is made 
robust to the modeled patterns of heteroscedasticity and cross-correlation. Finally, as the 
standard errors obtained in the two-step procedure are known to be downward biased 
Windmeijer correction is applied to the two-step standard errors.  
Dynamic analysis enables distinction between short and long run effects of 
decentralization and control variables on the dependent variable. Long run effect can be 
calculated as product of short run coefficient and long – run multiplier while the standard 
error and t – statistics for this coefficient can be obtained with the use of delta method (Papke 
and Wooldridge, 2008.). The above described method is applied to the dataset of 24 countries 
from both Western and Central and Eastern Europe2 covering 2005 – 2012 period which 
makes the overall sample of 168 observations. The choice of the analyzed countries is based 
on the availability of data for the construction of used variables. 
In comparison with earlier studies, current research presents an advancement in several 
ways. This primarily refers to the methodological approach that takes into consideration the 
correlation between economic growth and its past realizations. Furthermore, used 
methodology enables control for potential endogeneity of several variables. As noted in 
earlier sections, the potential endogeneity of fiscal decentralization and economic growth has 
 
2 Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Iceland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Hungary, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United 
Kingdom.  
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been recognized by theoretical literature for a long time but empirical studies have largely 
neglected this issue. Finally, the existing studies largely suggest that the impact of fiscal 
decentralization on economic growth is achieved in the long run, thus neglecting the short run 
effects. 
5. DISCUSSSION OF FINDINGS 
 
The starting point in the analysis of direct effects of decentralization on economic growth 
is the model: 
 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 = 𝑐 + 𝛼𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽1𝐹𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑇𝐴𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑡 +                              𝛽5𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑚2𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡20122007 + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡       (3) 
 
The dependent variable in the above equation is the annual rate of GDP per capita 
growth. Right hand side of the equation includes lagged dependent variable and variable FD 
which measures the direct impact of fiscal decentralization. As noted earlier, five indicators 
are used to measure these effects, defined as ratio between local government revenues and 
total national government revenues (FDREV), ratio between local government revenues and 
GDP (REVGDP), vertical fiscal imbalance index (VFI), ratio between local government 
expenditures and total expenditure of national government (FDEXP) and ratio between local 
government expenditure and GDP (EXPGDP). Taking into account that the above mentioned 
variables present different measures of the theoretical concept of fiscal decentralization, they 
enter the model interchangeably. Such an approach also enables testing the robustness of the 
relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic growth using different indicators.  
The estimation of indirect effects of decentralization is built on the previously 
mentioned hypothesis about the impact of fiscal decentralization on national development 
objectives which, in turn, influence economic growth. To this end, four indicators defined as 
government efficiency index (GE), corruption control index (CORUP), public sector size 
index (SIZEEXP) and non-income human development index (NI – HDI) are employed. As 
previously, these indices enter the model separately as they reflect different measures of the 
same theoretical concept, but also in order to evaluate the robustness of the results. The model 
can be expressed as follows: 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 = 𝑐 + 𝛼𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑇𝐴𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑡 +𝛽5𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑚2𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡20122007 + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡       (4) 
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Both equations (3) and (4) include control variables defined earlier. TAI index 
controls for the level of technological progress. Share of investment in GDP is measured with 
variable INVEST, while variable UNEMP controls for the unemployment rate. Openness of 
the economy is controlled with variable OPEN while variable AREAKM2 controls for the 
area size of the country. In addition to these variables model also includes categorical 
variables for the analyzed years taking the first two years as a base. The use of these variables 
controls for potential cross-sectional dependence due to universal time – shocks.  
In both estimations lagged dependent variable is treated as predetermined, while 
indicators of fiscal decentralization and development objectives as well as the share of 
investment in GDP are treated as endogenous. In instrument matrix these variables are 
instrumented with own lagged levels and differences while exogenous variables enter 
instrument matrix on their own. The following two sections present key findings of 
estimation. Prior to interpretation of results, relevant model diagnostics were examined in 
order to determine the validity of estimates. The tables with results of these tests can be found 
in the Appendix. All diagnostics relevant for dynamic panel estimators provide support to 
chosen specifications and enable the interpretation of results.  
5.1. DIRECT EFFECTS OF DECENTRALIZATION ON ECONOMIC GROWTH.  
Findings from estimation of direct effects of decentralization on growth are obtained 
through five specifications, where the decentralization is measured with indices FDREV, 
REVGDP, FDEXP, EXPGDP and VFI respectively. Table 1 summarizes the short-run direct 
effects of fiscal decentralization on economic growth and it reveals that the coefficient on 
lagged dependent variable is highly significant and positive. This signals that the current 
growth rate depends also on its past realizations.  
Table 1. Direct impact of fiscal decentralization on the economic growth – short run 
Variables/Specification 1 2 3 4 5 
Lagged dependent variable 0.24* 0.27* 0.42*** 0.44*** 0.54*** 
Constant -16* -24** -10 -12 0.71 
FDREV 0.31* - - - - 
REVGDP - 0.72** - - - 
FDEXP - - 0.09* - - 
EXPGDP - - - 0.22* - 
VFI - - - - -0.07* 
TAI 2.62 13.32 1.90 3.58 2.92 
Invest 0.46** 0.54*** 0.29 0.38 0.09 
Unemp 0.13 0.41 0.12 0.18 0.05 
Open 0.01 0.01 0.01*** 0.01** 0.01 
Areakm2 -0.01 -0.01 -0.0002 -0.001 -0.001 
 15 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
                Note: ***, **, *refer to statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
                p-values estimated using two – step dynamic panel method with Windmeijer robust standard errors.  
                Time dummy variables included.  
 
Turning to the most important issue, the direct effects of decentralization on growth, a 
positive and significant coefficient is obtained in specifications 1 – 4, which suggests that 
both expenditure and revenue dimensions of decentralization facilitate economic growth. 
However, the impact of VFI indicator, measure of vertical fiscal imbalances to growth is 
negative. This finding suggests that decentralized systems in which local governments rely 
more on own revenues are more efficient than those where the emphasis is on the transfers 
from the central government. 
Table 2: Direct impact of fiscal decentralization on economic growth – long run 
Variables/Specification 1 2 3 4 5 
FDREV 0.40* - - - - 
REVGDP - 0.99** - - - 
FDEXP - - 0.16* - - 
EXPGDP - - - 0.39* - 
VFI - - - - -0.15* 
TAI 3.42 18.21 3.28 6.34 6.40 
Invest 0.60*** 0.73*** 0.50 0.68* 0.19 
Unemp 0.17 0.56 0.21 0.31 0.10 
Open 0.02 0.02 0.02*** 0.02** 0.02 
Areakm2 -0.01 -0.01 -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
                             Note: ***, **, *refer to statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
                                     p-values estimated with delta method 
 
Analysis of long – run effects in Table 2 suggests that all variables retain their 
significance and sign in the long run. The magnitude of coefficients is approximately 1.3 to 2 
times larger than their short run counterparts. On the one hand, this finding confirms findings 
from earlier literature about the complete influence of decentralization on economic growth in 
the long run. On the other hand, reported results also question the validity of arguments put 
forth by some authors about the absence of short – run effects of decentralization on 
economic growth. 
 
5.2. INDIRECT EFFECTS OF DECENTRALIZATION ON DEVELOPMENT 
OBJECTIVES AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 
The investigation of indirect effects examines as previously, the robustness of the 
relationship between fiscal decentralization and development objectives with use of different 
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decentralization indicators. In general form, the model for investigation of effects of 
decentralization on development objectives can be defined as:  𝐷𝑉𝑖𝑡 =  𝑐 + 𝛼𝐷𝑉𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽1𝐹𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽3𝐵𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽4𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑙𝑎𝑤𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽6𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑚2𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽8𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡20122007 + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡    (5)                                                          
In equation (5) the dependent variable measures the improvement in achievement of national 
development objectives through four previously defined indicators: index of perception of 
control over corruption (CORUP), index of perception about government efficiency (GE), 
index of improvement in living standard (NI-HDI) and index of size of public sector 
(SIZEEXP). Right hand side of the equation includes lagged dependent variable and measure 
of fiscal decentralization defined in already described manner as FDREV, REVGDP, VFI, 
FDEXP and EXPGDP. Model also includes a set of categorical variables OPEN, AREAKM2 
and UNEMP as well as annual time dummies defined previously. In addition to these, model 
includes two categorical variables FEDUNIT and BOTELECT taking value of one if the 
country has a federal organization or if it has local and regional elections respectively. 
Finally, model controls for country population with variable AVERAGEPOP and for the rule 
of law (RLAW). Lagged dependent variable and measures of fiscal decentralization are 
treated as endogenous and thus instrumented with own lagged levels and differences. In the 
remainder of the paper results are presented for variables of key interest. In all subsections 
measures of fiscal decentralization enter interchangeably resulting with five specifications 
defined as previously.  
5.2.1. Impact of decentralization on control of corruption  
All variables measuring decentralization are highly significant, with similar magnitude 
and the same sign (Table 3). It can thus be concluded that a stronger role for local and 
regional governments (decentralization) positively influences perception about the control of 
corruption. Among control variables, findings from four specifications suggest that greater 
rule of law increases perception about control of corruption. Similarly, significant coefficients 
with negative sign are found on controls for regional and local elections as well as federal 
state organization. This signals that perception of control of corruption is lower if there is a 
larger administrative mechanism at lower levels of government. Finally, coefficient on lagged 
dependent variable is strongly significant and positive. 
Table 3. Impact of fiscal decentralization on the control of corruption – short run 
Variables/Specification 1 2 3 4 5 
Lagged dependent variable 0.61*** 0.79*** 0.59*** 0.73*** 0.63*** 
Constant 0.18 0.05 -0.32 -0.04 -0.85** 
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FDREV 0.03** - - - - 
REVGDP - 0.05* - - - 
FDEXP - - 0.01*** - - 
EXPGDP - - - 0.01** - 
VFI - - - - 0.01* 
Rlaw 0.38** 0.13 0.50* 0.35* 0.61*** 
Open -0.001 0.0002 0.0004 -0.0001 -0.001 
Botelect -0.53** -0.33** -0.21 -0.13** 0.24 
Unemp 0.004 0.01 0.01 0.0004 -0.01 
Fedunit -0.39*** -0.24*** -0.21** -0.09** -0.06 
Areakm2 -0.0004 -0.0002 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.00001 
Averagepop 1e-06 1e-06 -7e-07 -6e-07** -5e-06* 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
                 Note: ***, **, *refer to statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
                 p-values estimated using two – step dynamic panel method with Windmeijer robust standard errors.  
                 Time dummy variables included.  
 
Table 4 provides corresponding long run coefficients. All variables are measuring fiscal 
decentralization retain their signs and significance. The magnitude of obtained coefficients is 
2.5-3 times higher than one in the short run. Similar finding holds for control variables. 
Table 4. Impact of fiscal decentralization on the control of corruption – long run 
Variables/Specification 1 2 3 4 5 
FDREV 0.07*** - - - - 
REVGDP - 0.24** - - - 
FDEXP - - 0.04* - - 
EXPGDP - - - 0.04** - 
VFI - - - - 0.04* 
Rlaw 0.98*** 0.60 1.21*** 1.31*** 1.65*** 
Open -0.002 0.001 0.001 -0.0003 -0.002 
Botelect -1.35*** -1.60** -0.52 -0.48** 0.65 
Unemp 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.001 -0.01 
Fedunit -1.00** -1.16 -0.51 -0.32 -0.15 
Areakm2 -0.001 -0.001 0.0001 -0.0002 0.0001 
Averagepop 3e-06 7e-06 -2e-06 -2e-06** -0.00001** 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
                Note: ***, **, *refer to statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
                p-values estimated with delta method 
 
5.2.2. Impact of decentralization on government efficiency 
Results from Table 5 do not reveal major departure from previously reported findings. 
Apart from a statistically significant and positive sign on lagged dependent variable, all 
measures of fiscal decentralization have positive and statistically significant coefficient. This 
signals that decentralization also paves the way for more efficient public governance. 
Table 5. Impact of fiscal decentralization on the government efficiency – short run 
Variables/Specification 1 2 3 4 5 
Lagged dependent variable 0.42* 0.57* 0.52*** 0.56*** 0.67*** 
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Constant 0.38 0.15 -0.09 0.03 -0.33 
FDREV 0.02* - - - - 
REVGDP - 0.02* - - - 
FDEXP - - 0.02** - - 
EXPGDP - - - 0.02** - 
VFI - - - - 0.01* 
Rlaw 0.40* 0.33 0.24 0.30* 0.36*** 
Open -0.001 -0.0002 0.0003 0.0001 -0.001 
Botelect -0.39* -0.14 -0.16 -0.03 0.15 
Unemp 0.002 0.003 0.01 0.002 0.002 
Fedunit -0.33** -0.10* -0.26* -0.09* -0.05 
Areakm2 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0001 
Averagepop 9e-07 4e-07 -4e-07 -4e-07 -3e-06* 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
                        Note: ***, **, *refer to statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
                        p-values estimated using two – step dynamic panel method with Windmeijer robust standard errors.  
                          Time dummy variables included.  
 
Long run effects of decentralization on government efficiency (Table 6) retain their 
significance and sign in all cases except for variable measuring vertical fiscal imbalances 
(VFI). The magnitude is about 2.5 times higher than in the case of short run coefficients 
which is in line with previous findings. Among control variables, again rule of law is 
significant in all specifications while findings on other control variables vary across 
specifications. 
Table 6. Impact of fiscal decentralization on the government efficiency – long run 
Variables/Specification 1 2 3 4 5 
FDREV 0.04** - - - - 
REVGDP - 0.05* - - - 
FDEXP - - 0.04* - - 
EXPGDP - - - 0.04* - 
VFI - - - - 0.02 
Rlaw 0.68** 0.76*** 0.50* 0.68*** 1.11*** 
Open -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.0002 -0.002 
Botelect -0.67** -0.33** -0.33 -0.07 0.45 
Unemp 0.003 0.01 0.02 0.004 0.01 
Fedunit -0.57** -0.24* -0.53 -0.21** -0.14 
Areakm2 -0.0004 -0.001** -0.0003 -0.001 -0.0002 
Averagepop 2e-06 1e-06 -9e-06 -1e-06 -9e-06 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
                Note: ***, **, *refer to statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
                p-values estimated with delta method 
 
5.2.3. Impact of decentralization on the size of public sector 
So far, national development objectives were analysed through measures of public 
governance quality. However, theoretically hypothesized advantages of decentralization can 
be addressed along lines of leviathan hypothesis. For this reason, the impact of 
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decentralization on the size of the public sector is investigated in this section (Table 7). 
Findings are compatible with previous ones. All measures of fiscal decentralization are 
significant with a positive sign, a finding not consistent with leviathan hypothesis. Bearing in 
mind that the analysis covers a period of the recent global economic downturn the impact of 
decentralization on increased public expenditure can be associated with measures introduced 
by governments to combat recession. Similar to preceding specifications, the lagged 
dependent variable is significant and positive. Among control variables, a significant and 
negative impact of greater openness is found in three specifications measuring 
decentralization through revenue side. This is consistent with the efficiency hypothesis 
according to which higher public expenditure and related increase in taxation erode 
international competitiveness of domestic business entities. In turn, the latter impose pressure 
on reduction of public expenditure under threat of reallocation to other countries. Other 
control variables are mostly insignificant. 
Table 7. Impact of fiscal decentralization on the public sector size – short run 
Variables/Specification 1 2 3 4 5 
Lagged dependent variable 0.63*** 0.66*** 0.71*** 0.86*** 0.54*** 
Constant 22.5** 21.1* 15.6 6.63 18.57** 
FDREV 0.28*** - - - - 
REVGDP - 0.33* - - - 
FDEXP - - 0.37* - - 
EXPGDP - - - 0.21* - 
VFI - - - - 0.12* 
Rlaw 0.23 -0.25 -3.01 -0.85 2.10 
Open -0.03* -0.03* -0.02 -0.01 -0.03* 
Botelect -7.89*** -6.42 -7.72 -2.31 -2.27 
Unemp 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.06 
Fedunit -4.76** -3.12 -5.79 -1.71 -3.68* 
Areakm2 -0.004 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.004 
Averagepop 9e-06 8e-06 -2e-06 5e-08 -0.00004** 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
                        Note: ***, **, *refer to statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
                        p-values estimated using two – step dynamic panel method with Windmeijer robust standard errors.  
                          Time dummy variables included.  
 
Long run results are different from the ones reported before (Table 8). With exception of 
specification 2, none of fiscal decentralization measures are significant in the long run. It 
follows from the above that there is no relationship between fiscal decentralization and public 
sector size in the long run. Previously mentioned efficiency hypothesis seems to hold in the 
long run as well. 
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Table 8. Impact of fiscal decentralization on the public sector size – long run 
Variables/Specification 1 2 3 4 5 
FDREV 0.76 - - - - 
REVGDP - 0.99*** - - - 
FDEXP - - 1.30 - - 
EXPGDP - - - 1.54 - 
VFI - - - - 0.25 
Rlaw 0.63 -0.73 -10.5 -6.05 4.55* 
Open -0.09** -0.08** -0.07 -0.04 -0.07** 
Botelect -21.2* -18.96** -26.8 -16.5 -4.91 
Unemp 0.11 0.13 0.14 0.20 0.13 
Fedunit -12.8 -9.21* -20.1 -12.24 -7.97* 
Areakm2 -0.01 -0.01 -0.004 -0.004 0.01 
Averagepop 0.00002 0.00002 -7e-06 0.00003 -0.0001** 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
                Note: ***, **, *refer to statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
                p-values estimated with delta method 
 
5.2.4. Impact of decentralization on the improvement of living standard 
As final part of the investigation of the relationship between fiscal decentralization 
and development objectives, the impact of former on the living standard improvement index 
is investigated. Short run findings confirm our expectations (Table 9). Fiscal decentralization 
coefficients are significant and positive in all five specifications. This implies that 
decentralization positively influences living standard improvement in fields such as 
education, health or longevity (all of which are components of the dependent variable). Such 
finding is in line with arguments about better insight of local governments in public needs and 
preferences of households and business entities. Findings on control variables exhibit 
variation similar to ones found in the previous sections. In specifications 2, 4 and 5 negative 
and significant coefficients are found on control of the level of unemployment, consistent 
with well-established negative effects of unemployment on the living standard. 
 
Table 9. Impact of fiscal decentralization on the non-income living standard – short run 
Variables/Specification 1 2 3 4 5 
Lagged dependent variable 0.89*** 0.97*** 0.99*** 0.97*** 0.88*** 
Constant 0.10 0.02 -0.002 0.02 0.04 
FDREV 0.002* - - - - 
REVGDP - 0.0003** - - - 
FDEXP - - 0.0004* - - 
EXPGDP - - - 0.0003* - 
VFI - - - - 0.001** 
Rlaw -0.001 -0.002 -0.004 -0.002 0.01 
Open 0.00003 0.00001 0.00002* 0.00002 0.0001 
Botelect -0.01 0.001 0.0002 0.002 0.03*** 
Unemp 0.00002 -0.0002** 0.0001 -0.0001* -0.001*** 
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Fedunit -0.01 0.001 -0.003 0.001 0.003 
Areakm2 -0.00001 1.29e-06 -2e-06 1.64e-06 0.00002** 
Averagepop 1e-07 1.57e-08 7e-09 1.23e-09 -2e-07** 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
                        Note: ***, **, *refer to statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
                        p-values estimated using two – step dynamic panel method with Windmeijer robust standard errors.  
                          Time dummy variables included.  
 
Long run coefficients of fiscal decentralization (Table 10) are all non-significant 
which suggests the non-existence of the relationship between decentralization and living 
standard in the long run. Similar finding holds for control variables as well.  
Table 10. Impact of fiscal decentralization on the non-income living standard – long run 
Variables/Specification 1 2 3 4 5 
FDREV 0.01 - - - - 
REVGDP - 0.01 - - - 
FDEXP - - 0.17 - - 
EXPGDP - - - 0.01 - 
VFI - - - - 0.01 
Rlaw -0.07 -0.07 -1.92 -0.07 0.05 
Open 0.0002 0.001 0.01 0.001 0.0004 
Botelect -0.13 0.03 0.08 0.06 0.25 
Unemp 0.0002 -0.007 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 
Fedunit -0.13 0.04 -1.53 0.04 0.02 
Areakm2 -0.0001 0.0001 -0.001 0.0001 0.0002 
Averagepop 1e-06 6e-07 3e-06 - -1e-06 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
                Note: ***, **, *refer to statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
                p-values estimated with delta method 
 
Results on the relationship between fiscal decentralization and development objectives 
are shown in Table 11. As it can be seen from there with the exception of SIZEEXP, 
variable measuring size of the public sector, all measures of fiscal decentralization 
have expected signs. Hence, the positive impact of fiscal decentralization on 
development objectives such as government efficiency, control of corruption and a 
higher living standard is confirmed. However, the expectation of reduction of the size 
of public sector, known as leviathan hypothesis, was not confirmed. 
Table 11. Summary of findings on the impact  
of fiscal decentralization on development objectives 
 GE CORUP SIZEEXP NIHDI 
FDEXP + + +* +* 
FDREV + + +* +* 
REVGDP + + + +* 
VFI + + +* +* 
EXPGDP + + +* +* 
                           Note: * short run only 
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5.2.5. Impact of development objectives on economic growth 
 
As a final step in the analysis of the impact of decentralization on economic growth of 
the residuals from the previous stages have been inserted in the growth equation. To this end, 
four specifications were constructed where transmission channels are defined as government 
efficiency (GE) in specification 1, control of corruption (CORUP) in specification 2, public 
sector size (SIZEEXP) in specification 3 and non-income human development index (NI-
HDI) in specification 4. 
Table 12: Indirect impact of fiscal decentralization on economic growth – short run 
Variables/Specification 1 2 3 4 
Lagged dependent variable 0.38*** 0.25*** 0.42*** 0.23*** 
Constant -12 -6.7* -12 -22** 
GE 4.39* - - - 
CORUP - 2.04*** - - 
SIZEEXP - - 0.17* - 
HDI - - - 0.18* 
TAI -0.32 -1.13 4.26 0.99 
Invest 0.29* 0.30*** 0.22 0.33** 
Unemp 0.27 0.08 0.06 0.004 
Open 0.001 -0.002 0.003 0.002 
Areakm2 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 0.001 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
                        Note: ***, **, *refer to statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
                         p-values estimated using two – step dynamic panel method with Windmeijer robust standard errors.  
                            Time dummy variables included.  
 
Results in Table 12 provide further support to the thesis about the relationship 
between current growth and its past realizations. The magnitude of coefficient varies between 
0.25 and 0.42 which is comparable to earlier estimates. Obtained results also provide support 
for the thesis about the indirect effects of decentralization on economic growth in the short-
run. In all specifications, a positive and statistically significant coefficient is obtained. Such 
finding is further evidence of the complexity of the relationship between fiscal 
decentralization and economic growth. Among other variables, a positive impact of 
investment is reported in all but specification 3. 
Table 13: Indirect impact of fiscal decentralization on economic growth – long run 
Variables/Specification 1 2 3 4 
GE 7.04* - - - 
CORUP - 2.73** - - 
SIZEEXP - - 0.30 - 
HDI - - - 0.24** 
TAI -0.51 -1.51 7.28 1.30 
Invest 0.47* 0.41*** 0.37 0.43** 
Unemp 0.44 0.10 0.10 0.01 
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Open 0.001 -0.003 0.01 0.003 
Areakm2 -0.003 -0.002 -0.004 0.001 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
                             Note: ***, **, *refer to statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
                                       p-values estimated with delta method 
 
Analysis of long – run effects in Table 13 further supports our expectations. With the 
exception of public sector size, all indicators of development objectives are significant with a 
positive sign. A magnitude of coefficient is between 1.3 and 1.7 times larger than short run 
effects which is further evidence of a hypothesis about complete effects of decentralization 
being visible in the long run. 
6. CONCLUSION 
Past thirty years have witnessed trends of fiscal decentralization and various reforms of 
local fiscal systems in both developed and developing countries. Such developments have 
been driven by both economic and political motives. While in developed countries 
decentralization was instrument for reorganization of state with the aim of better provision of 
a growing number of public services, in developing world decentralization was driven by 
sluggish economic growth, macroeconomic instability, inefficient public administration and 
political pressures. In transition economies, decentralization was a part of the movement from 
centrally – planned to market economy. Evidence from all groups of countries suggests that 
the achievement of decentralization is a challenging task. The achievement of national 
development objectives depends on successful delegation and complementarity of 
responsibilities between central government and lower governmental levels, as well as 
between private and public sector, in the provision and financing of public services.  
Bearing the above said in mind, the objective of this paper was to explore the impact of 
fiscal decentralization on economic growth while taking into account multidimensional nature 
of transmission channels between the two. For this reason a model was developed that takes 
into account the dynamic nature of growth, direct and indirect transmission channels of 
decentralization, its potential endogeneity and the distinction between short and long run 
effects. These issues have largely been ignored in earlier empirical research.  
The obtained results provide support to both direct and indirect effects of decentralization 
on economic growth. Particularly interesting are findings related to vertical fiscal imbalances 
and size of the public sector. The former suggests that countries where local governments rely 
more on own revenues rather than transfers from the central level are more prosperous. The 
latter finding contradicts Leviathan hypothesis and suggests that increase in size of the public 
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sector facilitates economic growth. Such finding questions the current prevalent thinking 
about the beneficial effects of public sector reforms, aimed at the reduction of public 
expenditure, on economic growth.  
Bearing in mind the fact that the analyzed period covers the most recent global economic 
downturn, our findings are consistent with evidence on recovery of individual economies. It is 
well established that countries where fall of private spending had been supplemented with 
public expenditure were among the first to embark on the road to recovery. Together these 
findings are consistent with theoretical propositions that favor proactive government 
approach, including fiscal policy measures to stimulate demand, prevent decline of production 
and employment and rebuild trust in institutions. Furthermore, our findings are on track of 
recommendations of policy makers. As noted by European Union's European Framework for 
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